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This study draws upon interviews of medical staff working in the city of Minamisoma, Japan, following
the 2011 Triple Disaster. It investigates staff responses to the disruption of material resources as a
consequence of the disaster and its management. The disruption of spaces, and the loss of oxygen
supplies, food, and medications impacted upon staff experience and the ability of institutions to care for
patients. This resulted in a restructuring of spaces and materials as workers made efforts to reconﬁgure
and reestablish healthcare functions. This is one of the few qualitative studies which draws upon the
experience and perspectives of health workers in understanding material disruption following disaster.
This is particularly important since this case did not involve the breakdown of lifeline infrastructure, but
rather, brought to attention the way everyday material objects shape social experience. In highlighting
these effects, the paper makes the case for the social scientiﬁc investigation of the impact of disasters on
healthcare, shedding light on an area of research currently dominated by disaster medicine.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
On 11 March 2011 at 2:46 p.m., a magnitude 9.0 earthquake hit
the Tohoku region of north-east Japan. Now known as the Great
East Japan earthquake, this event caused signiﬁcant damage to
inhabitants and dwellings. The off-shore epicentre precipitated a
series of tsunami waves e travelling as far as 10 km in-land - along
the East coast, resulting in nearly 20,000 recorded deaths
(Nakahara and Ichikawa, 2013). A further consequence was damage
to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, and the resultant
release of radioactive materials. The combination of these three
events e referred to as the 2011 Triple Disaster e has had a long-
lasting impact upon the affected region.a Wellcome Trust small grant
nk Amina Sugimoto for her
e anonymous reviewers for
beysinghe).
r Ltd. This is an open access articleThis paper examines ﬁve health institutions across Minami-
soma, a city with a ‘centre’ approximately 25 km from the Daiichi
Plant, with (at the time of disaster) a relatively small population of
approximately 71,000 (Zhang et al., 2014). The city spreads across
three evacuation zones, created by the central government of Japan
in response to the nuclear accident (Hasagawa, 2013). These were
the 0-20 km Mandatory Evacuation Zone, the 20-30 km Voluntary
Evacuation Zone (a liminal zone where evacuation was ‘voluntary’
but residents were subjected to indoor sheltering), and 30 þ km
non-evacuation areas (please refer to Fig. 1). Minamisoma is the
closest regional centre to the Daiichi Plant and its placement across
all three zones had an important impact on the experience of
healthcare.
While there is a well-developed literature around the impact of
disasters on healthcare institutions, this arises principally from the
perspective of hospital management (Bar-Dayan et al., 2000;
Wattanawaitunechai and Jitpratoom, 2005) and disaster pre-
paredness (Kaji and Lewis, 2006; Manley et al., 2006). In particular,
this literature emphasises the importance of maintaining ‘lifeline’
infrastructure e water, electricity, gas lines and buildings e inunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1994; Kuwata and Takada, 2003), and focuses on management
decisions. Accounts of previous disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina
(Klein and Nagel, 2007; Rodríguez and Aguirre, 2006) blackouts
(Klein et al., 2005) and the Three Mile accident (Maxwell, 1982)
point to the role of materialities, and their impact in creating and
reinforcing inequalities. However, this literature too tends to focus
on hospitals where lifeline infrastructure has been affected.
Also from the hospital management literature, work on the ef-
fects of disasters on healthcare staff empirically focus on quanti-
tative investigation, for example accounting for health system
breakdown, staff loss or in measuring stress (Qureshi et al., 2005;
Wallace et al., 2007). There is little extant qualitative literature on
the experience of staff in managing a disaster, with a limited
literature of descriptive qualitative ﬁndings arising primarily from a
nursing studies perspective (French et al., 2002; Sebastian et al.,
2003). First person reports or narrative accounts also prevail. In
respect to Fukushima, these have been produced by individual
doctors (Nangaku and Akizawa, 2011) or hospitals (Irisawa, 2012;
Koyama et al., 2011), and serve to highlight the role played by
medical staff and provide insight from direct experience.
Social scientiﬁc analyses of disasters tend to focus on the social
construction (Bankoff, 2004; Petryna, 2004; Stallings, 1995) or
production (Perrow, 2011) of disaster risk, or the (inequitable)
distribution of vulnerability (Branshaw and Trainor, 2007; Bolin,
2007; Klinenberg, 2015; Phillips et al., 2010; Tierney, 2006;
Wisner et al., 2004). A smaller literature examines the material
experience of individuals who have survived natural disasters
(Harada, 2000; Hastrup, 2010; Wilford, 2008), focusing on the way
in which individuals rebuild social identities through (re)forming
material surroundings and re-establishing home. There is an
increasing and varied literature on the effects of the Fukushima
disaster from sociological and anthropological perspectives (Gill
et al., 2015; Hindmarsh, 2013), and within this an acknowledge-
ment of the key role played by medical professionals. For example,
Fortun and Morgan (2016), in making the case for comparative
disaster studies, note the technical and operational challenges and
communication issues faced by physicians post-Fukushima. Un-
derstanding the experiences of healthcare staff is key to fully ac-
counting for the impact of disaster, and is a perspective that is
currently under-examined.
While disaster management literature acknowledges the difﬁ-
culties faced by medical professionals, this is under-studied
through a use of qualitative data investigating the perspective of
the actors themselves. This paper provides a qualitative sociological
investigation of the experiences of these actors, which is novel in
both the ﬁelds of disaster management and in medical sociology
(where studies of disaster contexts are rare), despite calls for
deeper sociological engagement with the problem of disasters
(Tierney, 2007; Williams, 2008).
2. Methods
When the disaster occurred, Minamisoma was served by 8
hospitals and over 30 out-patient clinics. In combination, these
institutions catered to the health needs of residents of the city and
the wider rural area. Japanese universal health coverage operates
under a pluralistic system; but, despite multiple sources of insur-
ance, the national fee schedule means that payment is invariable
regardless of where the care takes place (Ikegami et al., 2011;
Ikegami and Campbell, 1995). Ikegami and Campbell (1995: 1296)
note that “[v]irtually all physicians are in solo practice, and most
hospitals are small, family enterprises that developed from physi-
cians' ofﬁces.… [L]arge hospitals are owned by the national or local
governments, voluntary organizations, and universities. For-proﬁtinvestor-owned hospitals are prohibited.”
Two hospitals in Minamisoma provided to a large number and
variety of patients. The ﬁrst is a comprehensive public hospital
which is situated in the 20-30 km ‘Voluntary Zone’. The second is a
large private hospital which tended to deal with emergency and
surgical cases as well as general medicine, also situated in the
‘Voluntary Zone’ at the time of disaster. Both the public and private
hospital were of a similar size (between 180 and 240 beds). This
paper documents the disaster's impact on these hospitals. It also
rests on accounts from staff from three small private clinics, two of
which have re-started operations, and one which is no longer in
operation. The study is based on interviews with 35 medical staff
who had beenworking at the point of the Triple Disaster, including
doctors, nurses, allied health professionals, medical technicians,
and administrative/support staff. The study focus is also informed
by the secondary analysis of ﬁve informational interviews with
medication suppliers and pharmacy operators conducted by
Tsubokura.
One of the effects of the disaster e and of the confusion around
radiation e was that a large proportion of medical staff evacuated
the area (Kodama et al., 2014; Ochi et al., 2016). The region con-
tinues to suffer from a shortage of medical staff, one factor which
makes understanding the disaster from the view of staff vital. At
various points following the disaster fewer than 10 doctors
remained in the public hospital, the largest research site. This
limited the number of individuals available to interview. As such,
and considering the high degree of saturation in the data around
the issue of resources, this provides a representative account of staff
experiences during the disaster. All remaining staff who were
willing to be interviewed were actively recruited. The interviewees
were enlisted by Ozaki, through a combination of formal recruit-
ment (emails and personal communications), and by a snowballing
from an initial sample and through gate-keepers. Ethics approval
was granted by the committee of Minamisoma General Municipal
Hospital (case number 28-6) and the University of Edinburgh. The
research participants were provided with written (Japanese) in-
formation sheets. These were also verbally reviewed at the start of
each interview, including the explicit consent for the interviews to
be recorded and information on the extent of anonymization. Both
verbal and written consent was obtained from each participant.
Each interview was conducted in Japanese with interpretation
being provided between the English-speaking primary interviewer
(Abeysinghe) and the interviewees. Interpretationwas provided by
Leppold, Ozaki and Morita with at least two interpreters being
present at each interview to provide real-time checking. Transcripts
were also checked to pick up additional translation issues prior to
coding of interview data. All interviews were conducted by Abey-
singhe, apart from one small-group interview of four medical
technicians, who agreed to the interviewed only on the condition
that they do so as a group. This interview was conducted in Japa-
nese by Ozaki, with Leppold and Abeysinghe present, and subse-
quently translated. Translation can impact the nature of the data
(e.g. choices about the most accurate translation of culturally-
speciﬁc words/ideas and potential issues around implied mean-
ing). However, the data was analysed using a broad thematic
analysis, focusing on explicit narratives and key themes produced
by the interviews, rather than discourse or semiotic analysis (for
example), which would involve a close reading of language. All
authors identiﬁed initial themes, which were coded and iteratively
developed into sub-codes by Abeysinghe, following the approach to
thematic analysis set out by Braun et al., (2012).
Interviews lengths ranged from 45 min to 2 h and 20 min
following a semi-structured approach (Silverman, 2006) and were
conducted in May-August 2016. The questions focused upon the
interviewees' experience of their work during the time of the
Fig. 1. Evacuation Zones in relation to Minamisoma City.
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a semi-chronological account, allowing space to focus on moments
which were critical to the interviewees' experiences of work and/or
changes in job roles. Due to the disruption of the disaster, many
staff changed positions or job status (e.g. moved hospitals or
stopped working); occupation and location at the time of the
disaster are cited here. This paper focuses upon data related to the
period spanning 11 March to (roughly) 27 March 2011. This follows
the impact of the earthquake and tsunami (11 March), nuclear ac-
cident (unfolding 12-15 March), evacuation of hospital in-patients
(up to 20 March) and the situation immediately following
evacuation.3. Results
3.1. Initial disruption of materialities
Staff experiences focused around the key issue of material
disruption. In understanding this aspect of staff experience, it was
clear that the initial earthquake had a key impact in rearranging
things and places. Recollections often dwelt upon the sudden dis-
order of materials. For nurses in both the clinics and the hospitals,
some of the clearest memories from that period pointed to the
physical reordering of their work environment:
Going to the wards, it was so surprising, because everything had
been shaking so that the beds going in all directions, they
weren't lined up. They were turned in odd directions. And so we
went to check on all the patients, to make sure that no-one had
fallen out or anything. But even fans from the ceiling had fallen
down. (Nurse, Private Hospital)
As this example shows, the immediate disorder created by the
earthquake created a point of initial concern.
The work following the earthquake therefore focused upon
recreating order out of these things and spaces:
…there was actually a sixth-ﬂoor ward as well, but the sprinkler
system had gone off, and there were all of these problems with
water. So the other nurses and I, we were trying to … we had
sheets and wewere trying to deal with the water issues. And wewere soaking up the water and squeezing out the sheets. Doing
things like that to get rid of the water. (Nurse, Private Hospital)
Nurses in the clinics served similar roles immediately following
the disaster:
Things had fallen down, so we just started cleaning up the clinic.
It took a lot of time to clean everything. I'm not sure how many
hours. Probably we just continued cleaning until the evening. I
was cleaning the building and I kept going up to different ﬂoors
and cleaning. (Nurse, Clinic)
This focus on restoring the material order of the workplace was
dominant throughout nurses' accounts. In contrast, for doctors and
technicians, immediate thoughts also turned to checking that
medical technologies were still functioning:
So then, I… there was water coming out on the sixth ﬂoor, so I
went to check on that. And I also went to check on the venti-
lation machines, and when I was doing that, the message came
that a tsunami was about to come. (Doctor, Public Hospital)
So we were ﬁrst checking on all of the machines, to make sure
whether they could be used or not.…Whenwewere looking at
ours, it seemed like basically the CT scan and the MRI scan were
essentially ﬁne. (Technician, Public Hospital)
In the two hospitals, these more complex pieces of medical
equipment e often among the ﬁrst things that came to mind for
staff after the shaking stopped - remained functional. Medical re-
sources did not become highlighted as a point of concern until later
in events.
The next key event was the growing understanding among staff
that the disaster (at this point, now both the earthquake and
tsunami) would produce an inﬂux of new patients with injuries.
This led to a purposeful rearrangement of resources and spaces. In
preparing for these patients, staff re-conceptualised spaces and
rearranged objects:
…the staff in our hospital moved all of the bed and medicines
into the ICU. So even in the lobby of the out-patient ofﬁce, we
lined up all of these chairs and we made make-shift beds out of
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thought, maybe it was like … you either die or you lived, and
there is not really anything in between that. (Pharmacist, Private
Hospital)
While the patients did not immediately appear, as had been
expected, casualties did arrive the following morning. This led to
alternative uses of space and of medical devices:
So wewere contacted and told to bring things down to the ward
to keep these people warm. Such as bags full of hot water. We
were told to bring these to the ﬁrst ﬂoor. And we were also told
to bring the warming ﬂuids or other equipment from the
operating rooms. From the operating rooms, we bought these
down to the ﬁrst ﬂoor as well. (Nurse, Private Hospital)
The repurposing of space also altered the way in which care was
provided:
I was going to do x-ray scans, and I remember walking the halls.
And the halls were full of patients. There were patients every-
where. Even the operating theatres, where surgeries were not
happening. Patients were in there too. On the ﬂoors. Usually you
would put the patients on a bed and take an x-ray there. But we
were taking x-rays with the patients just lying on the ﬂoor.
(Technician, Public Hospital)
The social and professional outcome of the disaster was a
remaking of space, technology and practices. This triggered the
longer-term destabilisation of the places and objects of healthcare.3.2. Missing materials
The initial disruption and disorder caused by the earthquake
and tsunami were just a starting point to accounts of the disaster.
For workers in the three clinics, these events led to the closure of
their workplaces, and (following the radiation accident) their own
evacuation out of their homes. For hospital workers, the closure of
clinics led to a re-centring of the hospital as one of the few
remaining sites of community healthcare. The nuclear power plant
accident on the afternoon of March 12th placed additional burdens
on the structure and function of the hospital.
Previously steady, stable and taken-for-granted resources came
to the forefront of staff experiences. This periodewhere supplies of
everyday hospital resources became destabilised e received the
most emphasis in interviewees' accounts of the crisis of care. For
example, one manager (following our explanation of the research)
spontaneously opened his interview:
In terms of our hospital, the main problem was oxygen. People
had to send us supplementary packages of oxygen, twice aweek
or so. The tanks we had were too small. So I think that was
probably my biggest concern at the time of the disaster. We had
a 5 tonne tank of oxygen and we have now added another 3
tonne tank, after the disaster. In total, there are now 8 tonnes.
That was an important change. (Doctor/Manager, Public
Hospital)
This example serves to highlight the central place of seemingly
everyday hospital resources in managing the aftermath of the Tri-
ple Disaster. Issues with oxygen were a major point of concern
across the hospitals in the city:But even more than the medicines what was really tough was
when the oxygen wouldn't come in.…Normally we had these
big oxygen tanks in this area and we would use those. But we
became unable to use those [as they started running low], and
people were instead sending these really small oxygen tanks to
us. At one point there were even efforts to use this device to
distil oxygen from the atmosphere … (Pharmacist, Public
Hospital)
For the hospital administration, disruption in supplies of oxygen
became amajor source of anxiety inmaintaining the function of the
hospital.
This shortage, rather than issues with medical technologies or
personnel, became fundamental to the closure of medical sites. In
accounting for the closure of the Private Hospital:
I think maybe if we had received some information, and some
supplies, it would have been better to not close the hospital. The
important factor was oxygen.Wewere getting this twice aweek
[normally]. That's the same for the oil for the heaters. Because of
that, that's why I thought to close the hospital. [I: You weren't
getting any of those supplies at all?] No. They didn't come at all.
If they had come, I would not have left. If [listing the levels of
government] had been able to supply those sorts of things, I
think it would have been better for the lives of the patients to
keep the hospital going. (Doctor/Manager, Private Hospital)
Lack of supply of basic resources was therefore fundamental to
the crisis of care experienced within the city in the fortnight
following the disaster. This disruption was a direct result of the
enactment of the 30 km ‘Voluntary Zone’ beyond which many
private supply companies refused to send vehicles and drivers. This
led to a situation where there was a sizable population to be cared
for in this area (since it was not an ofﬁcial Mandatory Evacuation
Zone) but everyday supplies were diminishing. This posed an issue
for remaining citizens (who were free to leave) but also placed a
heavy burden on healthcare (where remaining staff felt it was their
duty to stay, but where provision of care became increasingly
untenable).
For staff working closely with patients, such as nurses and
pharmacists, issues with food and ﬂuids (in addition to oxygen
supply, which tended to be focused upon by doctor-managers)
were also critical to their work:
Even food for the patients would be coming in less and less. First
one dish would be removed, and from the next meal another
dish would be removed. Little by little the patients' food also
decreased [in volume]. And so we were trying to use as little as
possible. And when something ran out, we were just trying to
use what we had to take care of the patients. For example,
usually we used two or three bottles of ﬂuid per day for the
patients. But at this time they would get one bottle per day.
(Nurse, Private Hospital)
The problem of food was fundamental to structuring the work
experiences of some staff. The nurse-manager in charge of this
effort commented:
The problem was how to prepare for food. Because we weren't
making any food at the hospital [during normal operations], it
was all delivered. And [during the disaster] the staff from the
company that was preparing our food, they had all evacuated.
So, I was then in charge of making kyushoku [‘school lunch’,
here referring to hospital meals]. I was in charge of making three
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in that … That was the most difﬁcult thing. (Nurse/Manager,
Public Hospital)
While doctors and technicians expressed most worry about the
loss of medical supplies and oxygen, other categories of workers (in
particular nurses) found the disruption in food supplies to be the
principal factor in structuring their work. This restructuring in tasks
across professional boundaries shows how the relationship be-
tween staff and their objects of work was also mediated by pro-
fessional status.
What is signiﬁcant is that in this disaster the infrastructure
(buildings and lifeline supplies), technical materials (equipment)
and staff were all still functioning within the hospitals. This
therefore presents a contrast to cases where lifeline infrastructure
has failed, as presented by much of the existing research on the
breakdown of hospital function during disasters.
From the standpoint of medicine, as long as the doctors were
there, we were able to medically take care of the patients. But
there were some obvious things we couldn't do. Especially with
the food, for diabetic patients or people who needed low-caloric
meals, we couldn't control that at all. And for patients who had
undergone surgery and needed liquid meals, we were
completely unable do that either. (Nurse/Manager, Public
Hospital)
This disruption inﬂuenced the ability to provide care, but also
deeply impacted the lives of the staff themselves. For example,
many staff members had been working, sleeping, eating and living
in the hospital in the period following the disaster. This included
staff whose homes had been rendered uninhabitable due to the
tsunami or earthquake, and staff who had endured mandatory
evacuation of their (often intact) homes due to the radiation crisis.
For such staff, the breakdown of material supply also led to the loss
of their use of the hospital as a temporary home:
…[I was living here] [f]romwhen I ﬁrst came here at the time of
the disaster until the end ofMarch. And at that point they told us
that the staff couldn't stay here anymore, because it was too
difﬁcult to provide food. Therewasn't enough food. So theywere
trying to reduce the amount of food they had to make. (Nurse,
evac. to Public Hospital)
Loss of food and the resources of hospital life resulted in the
continued reallocation of space in the days following the disaster.
As well as affecting the hospital as a site of healthcare, this also has
a signiﬁcant impact of staff, particularly those who had taken up
residence in the hospital itself. While the hospital had initially
served as a refuge by those affected by the disaster, these functions
deteriorated as the constraints imposed by the evacuation zones
worsened.3.3. Hospital evacuation and post-evacuation
The breakdown of supply which lead to the closure of the Pri-
vate Hospital and other hospitals in the area resulted in the Public
Hospital being designated a catchment site for remaining in-
patients. Non-evacuated staff from the other hospitals began to
work in the Public Hospital to care for their transferred patients.
While this arrangement made sense in forming a single site for
patient care andmovement, it placed further strain on job roles and
relationships and on the spaces and objects of the Public Hospital in
maintaining care.Since the initial destabilisation of space during the earthquake,
the work areas of the hospital had not regained their original
purpose. During the crisis, the movement of patients from several
hospitals into the Public Hospital resulted in the repurposing of a
‘lecture theatre’ into a space for a large number of patients:
I think we probably had about 80 in-patients at that time. And
when we got here [to the Public Hospital], probably about 40 of
them e of the unconscious or bed-ridden ones e they were just
put onto the ﬂoor. Futons were laid out for them, and those
patients were just put onto the ground. These patients e yeah,
there were around 40 of them e they were all in the… there is
the big lecture auditorium room… Yeah, they were all laid out
on the ﬂoor there. We didn't have beds for them. So we couldn't
raise them up where they were lying down for feeding them or
anything. So we had to pick the patients up ourselves and feed
them ourselves. (Nurse, evac. to Public Hospital)
Associated with the re-purposing of spaces was the re-
purposing of staff. Formal occupational roles were distorted and
staff at all levels were undertaking work of other staff categories. In
reﬂecting on the conditions of the ‘lecture room’ a clerical worker
recalled:
For me, after we brought the patients here, they were actually in
this room. The patients were actually laid out on chairs. I had
never done this type of thing before, but I was even spoon-
feeding the patients at that point. (Support Staff, evac. to Pub-
lic Hospital)
The breakdown of objects and spaces at many of the hospitals in
the city therefore led to further strain on the spaces of the Public
Hospital and the staff (from all hospitals) who remained at the
hospital to care for the patients.
Despite the considerable strain on staff and resources, the Public
Hospital remained open to in-patients until the 19th March. At this
point, the central government and hospital management agreed to
the evacuation of in-patients from this hospital to beyond the
30 km zone. This order resulted in the evacuation of patients across
two days (19 and 20March). Given that the hospital had been under
considerable stress during the post-tsunami period, it is perhaps
unsurprising that this evacuation resulted in a breakdown of any
remaining order and high levels of staff stress:
So then I was in charge of moving the patients around. And at
one point we had a plan to move all of the patient to a different
place. We had been told that the ambulances would come to
evacuate the patients. So we moved all of the patients, to pre-
pare them for these ambulances to pick them up. But the am-
bulances wouldn't show… they never showed up. So we had to
take all the patients back to the wards. (Doctor/Manager, Public
Hospital)
Ambulances had to be shared across the hospitals in the region.
While the Public Hospital ﬁnally fully evacuated on the 19 and 20
March, a staff member from the Private Hospital recalls the
shortage of ambulances to his workplace:
But on the last day, when we would call an ambulance and say
‘we need an ambulance now to take our patients’, they would
not come. They said ‘oh, there are all being used by [Public]
Hospital’. And they wouldn't come. And when I really think
about it, [the Public] Hospital also received so many different
things that we did not. Like the DMAT teams came, the military
came, they were receiving things like oil for heaters. And that
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vate Hospital)
While ambulances and materials were scarce, this scarcity was
not uniformly experienced. Here, the doctor notes that the DMAT
teams established a base in the Public Hospital (thereby also
providing that hospital with further supplies) while the other
hospitals were not afforded similar public resources.
These disparities were also felt in relation to the evacuation of
patients out of the disaster zone. In reﬂecting on this movement of
patients, a manager of the private hospital reﬂects:
Our hospital's lifeline was complete. Electricity, gas, water, none
of these things were damaged. So, if these things are complete,
we didn't necessarily have to remove ourselves.
This was really difﬁcult. And this becomes a little difﬁcult to
explain. But basically, the government didn't help us to move
the patients at all. We just had to use our own connections; we
had tomake do. We brought buses from Shirikawa. Thenwe had
ambulances to Izu. (Doctor/manager, Private Hospital)
The focusing of relief efforts on the central public hospital
therefore had knock-on effects for the availability of other in-
stitutions in the city. In the end, this private hospital relied upon
personal connections in moving their patients:
The reason the evacuation went well was because we were us-
ing the connections available to us. We asked people we knew.
One thing is [local politician] - we talked in the middle of the
night. And he said he would arrange ambulances and supplies.
The second thing is that the Director of [one speciﬁc] Hospital in
Izu is one of my friends. I worked there before I worked here….
Sowewould always drink together. And he calledme and asked,
‘are you alright’, and I said ‘well, we're not alright’. Then they
said they would take the patients. (Doctor/manager, Private
Hospital)
As such, there was a perceived disparity in the allocation of
resources between the hospitals, and this was explained by the
interviewees as an outcome of the focus of resources onto the
public hospital and relative neglect of other institutions.
Again, disorder in staff roles is mirrored by disordered materi-
alities. The breakdown of communications meant that ambulances
did not arrive when expected (or at all), resulting in the movement
and re-movement of patients across the wards of the hospital:
The things I was being told up here on the sixth ﬂoor were
completely different to what the people down on the ﬁrst ﬂoor
would say. Sometimes we would take a patient down and they
would say ‘oh, it's not this person. You have to take them back’.
And so, we would bring them back the sixth ﬂoor. And then the
people here would say ‘oh, we have to double-check’. And then
they would call the ﬁrst ﬂoor. And it would go like that. (Nurse,
Public Hospital)
This again led to the re-ordering of materialities. The quote
below, for examples, shows how buses were re-purposed as
makeshift ambulances for unconscious patients:
There were a lot of patients who were unconscious or ones that
were immobile. So for those patients, we just had the tourism
buses. And we would have their stretchers and we would load
them into the buses, where the stretchers would be across thetop of the seat. So one stretcher over a pair of seat. I helped get
these patients into the buses and I went with them on the bus.
(Technician, Public Hospital)
Thus, one of the key impacts of the disaster on the hospital was
the way in which spaces, things (and also work roles) fell into
confusion. This had important implications on the way in which
staff and patients experienced the crisis and in the abilities of
healthcare institutions to maintain care in the city.
Following the evacuation of the hospital in-patients, there was
still a sizable population remaining in the city. This of course meant
that there were still health needs to be covered. The Public Hospital
remained open for out-patient services to deal with those needs. To
the surprise of many of the interviewed staff, out-patient clinics
began to be primarily used by people seeking medications.
About 90% of people had been using outside pharmacies before
the disaster. Soweweren't used to givingmedication to somany
out-patients at the out-patient clinic at once. … There weren't
that many types of medications in the hospital to start with. So
there were lots of medications that had been used by other
[specialist] hospitals … we didn't have those medications here
for our patients. So for those cases, we were also able to ﬁnd
something else that was suitable. The doctors had given us
permission to not even double-check with them. The doctors
left it to us to ﬁnd a suitable replacement for the scripts.
(Pharmacist, Public Hospital)
This quote again shows the degree to which job roles became
more ﬂuid during the crisis. In this case, pharmacists (bypassing the
need for doctors' orders) became involved in choosing medications
due to the lack of some drugs and the (brand and active agent)
substitution of other drugs.
As with the oxygen, oil and food, the disruption to the supply of
medicine was a product of the establishment to the 30 km Volun-
tary Zone around the power plant. Some interviewees felt that
medicines were simply not entering the area, though recollections
on this aspect were varied:
Even if you asked for the medication, no-one would bring it
here. But out of ﬁve times…maybe once or twice people would
come. But then after the 30km radius e the indoor sheltering
zone ewell, the 30km radius became a zone that you could not
enter. And from that order, even if people tried to bring things in,
they couldn't. (Pharmacist, Public Hospital)
The decision to establish the evacuation zones made by the
central government had a signiﬁcant impact on the spaces, in-
teractions and functions that could occur at the level of each health
institution or each healthcare worker. While the loss of the supply
of medication was felt and managed individually by the hospital or
the staff, these small-scale actions were part of the larger picture of
disruption to care in the region.4. Discussion
The Triple Disaster fundamentally disrupted the material and
spatial relations of health institutions. Through this disturbance,
everyday work materials gained prominence in terms of staff
experience. Resources and spaces became unstable, assumed
alternate roles and altered in signiﬁcance at different points in the
crisis. The staff restructured and repurposed the materials, just as
the loss of these materials restructured the realities and functions
of the health institutions.
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ities (Fox, 1997; van Hout et al., 2015). This follows from classical
literature on the symbolic role of objects in structuring professional
boundaries (Becker, 1961) and examinations of the social history of
medical artefacts (Pasveer, 1989). When examining the existing
contemporary literature around the role of materialities within
hospitals, these tend to focus upon novel, complex or contested
medical technologies (Prout, 1996; Timmermans and Berg, 2003)
despite explicit calls to examine the mundane within sociology
(Latour, 1992) as well as to connect with other social scientiﬁc ex-
planations, such as work on material culture (Miller, 2005). Socio-
logically, everyday healthcare resources such as food and ﬂuid have
been investigated in diverse (though few) studies (Feder-Alford,
2006; Harbers et al., 2002; McInerney, 1992; Thomson and
Hassenkamp, 2008). On the whole, the roles played by hospital
resources remain relatively unexamined within sociological ac-
counts. This research serves to add to this literature around the
important role played by material resources in forming the expe-
rience of healthcare work.
The study contributes to our understanding of the experiences
of healthcare workers during times of crisis. Within the literature
on disaster management, healthcare institutions are recognised as
pivotal to a community's experience (Kaji and Lewis, 2006). In
Minamisoma, it was clear that remaining healthcare institutions
and personnel served a vital role in allowing citizens to remain in
the ‘Voluntary Zone’ surrounding the nuclear accident site. Litera-
ture around the preparation for disaster highlights the importance
of the lifeline infrastructure of the hospital (Kuwata and Takada,
2003). However, for both the hospitals focused upon in this
study, these ‘lifeline’ materials were not disrupted. Yet the impact
of the loss of food, and particularly oxygen for respirators, points to
the need to more widely interpret the materials fundamental to a
hospital's survival in disaster events. Just as important is to
acknowledge the work performed by staff in restabilising these
disrupted materials e transforming food, repurposing spaces and
reorganising professional functions.
The loss of supply was not solely a result of the disaster itself but
a consequence of the organisation of healthcare and of the response
to the disaster. For example, staff from the private hospital reﬂected
that they felt that private institutions were left to rely on personal
contacts to try and negotiate resources, despite the fact that the
operation of these hospitals is central to care in the region. Ac-
cording to these recollections, DMAT teams focused on the largest
public hospital, leaving staff from the private hospital with the
impression that they were not receiving similar assistance.
The analysis of the policy around the evacuation zones, and
decisions to place resources at certain hospital sites, is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, these aspects present an important
area for future investigation in understanding the causes under-
pinning these experiences. This study shows how the bureaucratic
ordering of place, through the central government's decision to
draw up evacuation around the power plant, impacted deeply on
the daily experiences of staff and patients during the crisis. The lack
of supplies was directly related to this policy, as many suppliers
were unwilling or unable to enter the Voluntary Zone. Ultimately,
this resulted in the dangerous evacuation of patients (Nomura et al.,
2015), disruption of work and personal lives, and destabilisation in
the provision of healthcare. The situation, as captured in this
research, was cause for high levels of staff stress, as individuals
attempted tomaintain healthcare functions in the face of the loss of
supplies and in some case simultaneously managing the loss of
their own homes and communities (through forced evacuation, as
much as through the physical effects of disaster).
This research highlights the relationship between theseworkers
and objects of their work, emphasising (through the disruptioncaused by the disaster) the often taken for granted networks of
subjects and objects in stabilising the everyday practice of health-
care. A social scientiﬁc understanding of lived realities of the loss of
seemingly mundane resources of hospital life adds an important
perspectivewithin the sociology of disasters and is indicative of the
usefulness of health sociology (which currently has a limited in-
terest in interrogating disasters) in investigating such contexts.
5. Conclusion
This study examined the experiences of hospital and clinic staff
following the Fukushima Triple Disaster. In a context where life-
lines infrastructureswere functional, the loss of mundanematerials
had a profound effect of staff experiences of the disaster. In the case
of the Private Hospital, issues with the supply of these goods was
pivotal to the decision to close the facility. These issues are placed in
a broader context of the ofﬁcial designation of evacuation zones,
differences in the experiences of public and private hospitals and
the culmination of individual-level decisions (about evacuation and
about administering care during the crisis).
The experiences of Minamisoma medical workers highlights
that the disruption caused by the disaster served in effect to
emphasise previously taken for granted resources. The study points
towards the need to further understand the role of these mundane
resources and to examine the key part they play in the function of a
healthcare institution and that they can play in time of crisis. It also
highlights the need to further examine the experiences of health
workers during conditions of crisis, in order to develop a deeper
understanding of the experience of disaster, moving beyond hos-
pital management perspectives towards a health sociological
understanding.
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